

# Trusted Computing: The Convergence of Trusted, Safe, and Secure


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


# Goals of Trusted Computing



# Components of Trusted Computing

## Trusted Design & Manufacturing



## Protecting the Trusted System

### Cyber Security



### Physical Security



# Trusted Design & Manufacturing

**Functionality Flaws**

**Performance Flaws**


**Safety Flaws**

**Malicious Alteration**

**Stolen IP or Data**



# Trusted Design & Manufacturing



# JSF Supply Chain Compromised

**“Secret F-35, P-8, C-130, JDAM data stolen in  
Australian defense contractor hack”**

*October 11, 2017*



# Assurance of Trusted Design & Manufacturing

Issue	Assurance
Performance Flaws	AS9100
Reliability Flaws	VITA 47
Safety Flaws	DO-254 DO-178C
Malicious Alteration	US Persons & US Owned
Stolen Data or IP design data: deployed data:	DFARS Compliant; FIPS 140-2

[DFARS clause 252.204-7012](#), including [NIST 800-171](#)



# Assurance of Trusted Design & Manufacturing

Issue	Basic	Best
Performance Flaws	AS9100	
Reliability Flaws	VITA 47	Double the Cycles
Safety Flaws	DO-254 DO-178C	DAL-A with in-house certs
Malicious Alteration	US Persons & US Owned	DMEA Certified
Stolen Data or IP design data: deployed data:	DFARS Compliant; FIPS 140-2	James Cogswell Award from DSS; CSfC*

\*NSA's Commercial Solutions for Classified

<https://www.nsa.gov/resources/everyone/csfc/components-list/#hw-fde>





# Protecting Deployed Systems



## Cyber

- **Disabling or Denying Functionality**
- **Stealing Data or IP**
- **Taking control**



## Reverse Engineering

- **Stealing Data or IP**
- **Redeploying**
- **Cloning**

# Commercial Protection Technology Examples

## Intel

- Protected Boot/Boot Guard
- Trusted Execution Technology (TXT/TPM) *SW Root of Trust*
- Enhanced Privacy ID (EPID) *HW Root of Trust*
- Platform Trust Technology (PTT)
- Software Guard Extensions (SGX)

## Xilinx

- Key storage
- Bitstream decryption and authentication
- Readback disabling
- JTAG disable
- Environmental monitors
- Device DNA
- Internal memory clear

*These are some of the best commercial technologies*



# Commercial Protection is Not Sufficient

## “Intel fixes security flaw that plagued its processors for years”

*May 2, 2017*

- Critical flaw in Active Management Technology (AMT)
- Allows system to be taken over by a remote hacker
- Affects 7 generations of processors over 9 years of production

## “Intel Admits Security Flaws Contained in Most PC Chips It Sold for Years”

*November 21, 2017*

- Researchers uncover critical flaw in Management Engine (ME), Server Platform Services (SPS), and **Trusted Execution Engine (TXT)**
- Covers 10 different CVEs, including executing arbitrary code with escalation of privilege
- Affects 8 product families over 3 generations

## “Meltdown and Spectre Vulnerabilities Affect Nearly Every Computer”

*January 3, 2018*

- Applications, malware, and JavaScript running in **web browsers** and other users processes can access kernel memory and memory of other users
- Covers 3 different CVEs, that allow a rogue user to collect secret information such as passwords and authentication keys
- Affects multiple chip suppliers, including 24 Intel product families over 9 generations

# Mercury's System Security Engineering

## *Built***SECURE**<sup>™</sup>


- Suite of proven, seamlessly integrated software, firmware and hardware for robust system integrity
- Mercury is investing heavily in security IP
  - 30 person security solutions team with decades of expertise
- 4<sup>th</sup> Generation suite of proven System Security Engineering (SSE) IP
  - Baseline is built-in for Mercury Ensemble Series products
- IP can be applied at chip level, board level, and system level
  - Prevent unauthorized debugging
  - Ensure clock integrity
  - Boot securely
  - Respond to unauthorized access attempts
  - Prevent reverse engineering
  - Secure hypervisor



## Built**SECURE**™

### Trust and Security architectural elements

- Common elements built-in across products lines
  - 3U VPX, 6U VPX, 6U VME, ATCA, ATX
- Extensible architecture may host 3<sup>rd</sup> party, CFE, and GFE IP, SW, FW and HW



**3U OpenVPX  
LDS3506  
(XEON D)**

**6U OpenVPX  
LDS6525  
(Core i7)**

**6U OpenVPX  
HDS6603  
(Xeon E5)**

**ATCA  
HDS8613  
(Xeon E5)**

**2U Server  
HDS9624  
(Xeon E5)**

One investment leveraged across multiple missions

For More Information

*Built***SECURE**<sup>TM</sup>

[www.mrcy.com/BuiltSECURE](http://www.mrcy.com/BuiltSECURE)

